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It “commits to the standard physicalist claim that everything in this 
world, including trees, computers, stones, neutrons, and even our con-
scious experiences, are, in the relevant sense, all physical” (p. 135). It ac-
cepts, along with the arguments that Nagasawa has by now shown we 
have good reason to reject, the good premise: physical omniscience is om-
niscience simpliciter. However, it maintains—thus blocking these knowl-
edge arguments against it—that “theoretically communicable physical 
omniscience is not physical omniscience” (p. 136). So, “omniscience sim-
pliciter requires an instantiation of extraordinary epistemic powers to in-
tuit relevant propositions” (p. 136). Nagel’s situation (assuming he can’t 
turn himself into a bat) and Mary’s situation before she leaves the room 
are ones of (potentially [assuming he hasn’t swotted up on an encyclopae-
dia of bat theory] in the case of Nagel and actually in the case of Mary) 
being theoretically physically omniscient, but not omniscient simpliciter. 
Non-theoretical physicalism is still a theory—a physicalist theory in-
deed—then, but it “does not attempt to define physicalism in terms of the-
oretically communicable propositions” (p. 139). As Nagasawa points out, 
“Physicalism in general is committed to the ontological thesis that every-
thing in this world is, in the relevant sense, physical and, consequently, 
the physical omniscience thesis that physical omniscience is omniscience 
simpliciter. Physicalism is not, however, committed, by itself, even implic-
itly, to the theoretically communicable omniscience thesis” (p. 141). So 
non-theoretical physicalism—which denies the theoretically communi-
cable omniscience thesis—is, by the failures diagnosed in the arguments 
looked at in the course of Nagasawa’s book, the sort of physicalism which 
should be preferred.
Of course one might tug at some of these strands—definitions of physi-
calism, epistemic powers, theoretical communicability—and see what un-
ravelled, but all in all God and Phenomenal Consciousness is a closely-argued 
work that maps an underexplored area of shared borderland between the 
philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion and, as such, it will be 
of interest to philosophers working in either field and of especial interest 
to those working in both.
Toward a Theory of Human Rights, by Michael J. Perry. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2007. 253 pages. Cloth $70.00.
ROBERT T. MILLER, Villanova University School of Law
In this short book Michael J. Perry addresses three issues. First, he sets out 
what he calls the morality of human rights and argues that, although it 
is clear that religious theories can support such a morality, it is far from 
clear that non-religious theories can do so. Second, he asks which laws 
people who affirm the morality of human rights should press their gov-
ernment to adopt, especially in relation to capital punishment, abortion, 
and same-sex unions. Third, he inquires into the proper role of courts in 
protecting human rights entrenched in a nation’s constitutional law. This 
is a lot to do in 142 pages of text (the rest of the book is endnotes), and I 
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have serious doubts as to how much of Perry’s account succeeds. Since 
only Perry’s first issue concerns the relationship of faith and philosophy, 
I shall discuss primarily his treatment of that issue.
Acknowledging that there are many different moral systems, Perry says 
that by the phrase “morality of human rights” he means the twofold claim 
that every human being has inherent dignity and that we should respect 
such dignity. He emphasizes, however, that this definition leaves open 
the ground of human dignity, i.e., what meta-ethical account we should 
give of what dignity is and why human beings have it. He himself favors 
a Christian-eudaimonistic account: we are all beloved children of God and 
brothers and sisters of one another, and so our deepest fulfillment comes 
from loving one another as God has loved us.
Perry’s insistence that assertions about human dignity can be treated 
apart from a meta-ethics creates a serious philosophical problem. A word 
gets its meaning from the key propositions that embed it. By bracketing 
meta-ethical premises, Perry separates the word “dignity” from many of the 
propositions that would ordinarily give it meaning. By reducing the content 
of the concept of dignity to the point that it is equally consistent with eu-
daimonism, deontology, natural law theory, divine command theory, and 
maybe even consequentialism, Perry makes dignity into an empty place-
holder. Perry implicitly acknowledges the indeterminacy in the concept 
when he says that whether unborn human beings have dignity depends on 
what account of dignity we give. The problem, however, goes deeper. With 
no definite meta-ethics in the background, saying that human beings have 
inherent dignity means little more than that there are some things we ought 
not do to human beings. Which things these are, however, has not been 
specified, and people who disagree about the meta-ethics of dignity will 
sometimes disagree systematically about which norms dignity supports. 
Hence, the concept becomes useless for settling many moral disputes.
This comes out in some of Perry’s examples. He claims, for instance, 
that if a father strangles his innocent child to spare the child torture and 
death at the hands of another, this does not violate the child’s dignity. 
This seems to imply that any action whatsoever may respect a person’s 
dignity if the alternative is that someone else will do something far worse 
to him—a view traditionally associated with consequentialism. Perry ac-
knowledges that the Catholic tradition, to which he appealed in giving his 
religious theory of human rights, has consistently taught that killing the 
innocent is always wrong no matter what the circumstances. Perry sees 
this departure from Catholic doctrine, however, not as a deep philosoph-
ical disagreement but as an easily resolved disagreement about what a 
definite moral norm entails in a particular case. “To insist that if I choose 
to kill my daughter, I’d be treating her as if she lacks inherent dignity is, in 
a word, ridiculous” (p. 43). Here Perry misses the deep point. As Elizabeth 
Anscombe noted, the view that there are no actions always and every-
where wrong is a characteristic assumption of modern moral philosophy 
that was nearly universally rejected by moral philosophers from Aristo-
tle to Kant. My point is not that Perry is wrong to make this assumption 
(though I think he is) but that the plausibility of the assumption turns on 
contested issues in meta-ethics and even the philosophy of action. These 
issues should be identified and analyzed. Perry just looks at the facts of the 
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case, consults his moral intuitions, effectively reads those intuitions into 
the concept of dignity, and then pronounces the opposite view ridiculous.
When I say that Perry proceeds by consulting his intuitions, I do not 
exaggerate. In his closest approximation to a general criterion of what it 
means to respect the dignity of persons, Perry writes that there is “a cru-
cial question . . . for anyone who affirms that every human being has in-
herent dignity and who must decide whether intentionally to kill one hu-
man being . . . in order to save the lives of a number of others: ‘If someone 
I love dearly—my child, for example—were in the position [of the person 
I must kill], would I want my child to be killed in order to save those 
lives?’ . . . If the answer is ‘No,’ it seems fair to suspect that intentionally 
killing [the person] would be a failure of love, but if the answer is ‘Yes,’ it 
seems doubtful that intentionally killing [the person] would be a failure 
of love, that it would treat [the person] as if he lacks inherent dignity” (p. 
49). Leave aside the fact that, when a decision affects the interests of many 
people, we should have an impartial judge, not someone who especially 
loves one of the people affected and who is thus likely to shortchange 
the legitimate interests of others. The important point here is that when 
we ask ourselves what we would do in hypothetical cases, we are only 
determining the consequences of moral beliefs we already hold, includ-
ing deep conceptual presuppositions we may hold unawares. Philosophy 
should uncover these presuppositions and evaluate them, for often there 
are multiple, incompatible presuppositions we might hold all of which 
have some plausibility. Moral thought-experiments are thus not a reliable 
guide to philosophical truth. On the contrary, they trick us into making 
unacknowledged assumptions.
As to Perry’s assertion that it is clear that a religious theory can support 
the morality of human rights but far from clear that any non-religious 
theory can do so, this provocative claim turns out to mean much less than 
first appears (p. xi). Thus, it is clear to Perry that a religious theory can 
support the morality of human rights because people have articulated 
religious theories that, if true, would support the moral propositions in 
question. Perry does not argue that religious theories are convincing (the 
plausibility of religious belief, he says, is beyond the scope of the book), 
and, as far as I can tell, he does not deny the obvious fact that religious 
theories face well-known objections and are highly controversial. If this 
is all it takes for it to be clear that a certain kind of theory can support the 
morality of human rights, then surely it is equally clear that non-religious 
theories can support that morality too. There are any number of such theo-
ries that, if true, would entail the requisite moral propositions.
But it is far from clear to Perry that non-religious theories can support the 
morality of human rights because, apparently, he can raise philosophical 
objections to such theories, or, more accurately, he can raise philosophi-
cal objections to a few such theories selected not because they cover the 
field in contemporary moral philosophy but, as Perry candidly admits, 
their authors all teach in law schools, just as Perry does. Perry thus very 
briefly examines three non-religious moral theories: John Finnis gets four 
paragraphs, Ronald Dworkin seven, Martha Nussbaum five. This is the 
weakest section of the book, for Perry’s arguments generally fail to engage 
with their intended targets.
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In discussing Dworkin, for example, Perry refers to Dworkin’s argu-
ment in Life’s Dominion that we value human life because we value and 
wonder at the creative processes, natural and human, that produce hu-
man beings. Perry then asks, “But to whom is Dworkin referring with his 
‘we’ and ‘our’? Did the Nazis value the Jews intrinsically? The conspicu-
ous problem with Dworkin’s specification of the source of normativity 
. . . is that Dworkin assumes a consensus among human agents that does 
not exist” (p. 21). This, of course, misreads Dworkin. When Dworkin says 
that “we” value something, he does not mean that everyone in fact values 
the thing; he is not such a fool as to be ignorant of the obvious counter-
examples to such a claim. Dworkin means, rather, that there is good reason 
to value certain things, regardless of whether anyone in fact does so. This 
argument may or may not work, but Perry’s response never touches it. His 
treatments of Finnis and Nussbaum are comparably ineffective.
More generally, Perry thinks that secular philosophers cannot articu-
late a plausible ground for human dignity because they deny the existence 
not only of God but also of any metaphysical order in the universe. In fact, 
metaphysics is a thriving business in contemporary philosophy depart-
ments, but even if what Perry says is correct, I think he should have to 
consider non-religious moral systems that eschew ontology, such as the 
prescriptivism of R. M. Hare, the moral constructivism of John Rawls, the 
quasi-realism of Simon Blackburn, or what Hilary Putnam says in Eth-
ics Without Ontology. Perry mentions none of these. Perhaps even odder, 
Perry considers the possibility of non-religious eudaimonism (which he 
unaccountably thinks must be connected with evolutionary biology) but 
concludes, “As far as I am aware, it is not a position that any contemporary 
secular moral philosopher has advanced” (p. 25). Not in connection with 
evolutionary biology, to be sure, but Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Foot, 
Peter Geach, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Slote have all defended 
non-religious eudaimonist theories.
At most, therefore, Perry has shown that there are religious theories 
of undetermined merit that, if true, would support the morality of hu-
man rights, but that there are philosophical objections to the non-religious 
theories advanced by some famous law professors. In my view, this is 
not a reasonable basis for saying that it is “clear” that there is a religious 
ground for the morality of human rights but “far from clear” that there is 
a non-religious ground.
When Perry asks what laws the morality of human rights supports, his 
conclusions are nuanced. For example, he argues that all human beings 
have dignity from the moment of fertilization, but that the law should per-
mit abortion when the life or health of the mother is endangered, the fetus 
has a grave defect and will soon die anyway, the pregnancy arises from 
rape, or the fetus has “a serious genetic abnormality” (p. 61). The reasons 
for these exceptions, however, have less to do with human dignity than 
with the practical difficulty of enacting more stringent laws in a pluralis-
tic society. This highlights a problem that Perry never addresses head-on: 
which laws we should have depends on many things other than whether 
the underlying actions respect human dignity. Hence, many of Perry’s ar-
guments are unconnected with human dignity. At one point, Perry intro-
duces a duty, supposedly based on the morality of human rights, to pre-
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vent “unwarranted human suffering” (p. 34). But this duty is wider than 
the duty to prevent violations of dignity, for, Perry expressly says, some 
forms of “unwarranted human suffering” do not violate human dignity. 
How a moral system based on human dignity entails a duty to prevent 
certain actions that do not violate that dignity Perry never explains. Argu-
ments like this do much of the work in this part of the book.
As to the proper role of courts in protecting human rights, Perry argues 
that unelected judges can protect such rights better than elected legisla-
tors or executive officers because judges are more insulated from popular 
influence. This argument goes back at least to The Federalist. Perry then re-
fers to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, the idea that judicial review is 
suspect because allowing unelected judges the final say on the validity of 
legislation is anti-democratic. He argues for a compromise solution that al-
lows courts to invalidate legislation but also allows legislatures to overrule 
courts by following special super-majoritarian procedures. Such compro-
mises between unfettered democracy and judicial supremacy have been 
discussed in the literature for many years, and Perry provides illuminating 
accounts of the compromise systems in Canada and the United Kingdom. 
Finally, Perry argues that when, as in the United States, courts have the 
last word and amending the constitution is usually impracticable, courts 
should declare legislation unconstitutional only if there is no reasonable 
reading of the constitutional text under which such legislation would be 
valid—a position famously developed by Thayer. Perry applies Thayerian 
principles to conclude that the Supreme Court should find that capital pun-
ishment, laws banning abortions, and a state’s refusal to recognize same-
sex unions are all constitutional. Given Perry’s moral views on these issues, 
this section of the book is an impressive display of intellectual integrity.
In sum, the problems that infect Perry’s use of the word “dignity” 
ripple throughout his philosophical discussions in this book, and Perry’s 
argument that religious theories have an advantage over non-religious 
theories in supporting the morality of human rights is not persuasive. His 
discussion of the law of human rights is stronger, however, and his ex-
planations of various systems of judicial review will enlighten those who 
have not kept up with the relevant literature. Especially for philosophers 
not trained as lawyers but interested in the problems of translating moral 
conclusions into legal norms, this is a valuable book.
Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics by Patrick Lee and 
Robert P. George. Cambridge University Press, 2008; viii + 222 pp. Cloth, 
$80.00.
DANIEL N. ROBINSON, Oxford University
In his attempt to “Newtonianize” what would now be called psychology, 
Locke famously reduced the contents of mental life to corpuscular entities 
(“simple ideas”) which, by a process of association, were melded into ever 
more complex ensembles. The source of the elementary ideas was compa-
rably elementary sensations. Locke’s related and further task was to rid 
